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How the no confidence move against Iraq's
premier split the Kurdish parties 22.8.2012
By Joel Wing �
Ekurd.net |
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Iraqi leaders (from L to R), Sunni parliament
speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, the president of the
autonomous Kurdistan region Massoud Barzani,
President Jalal Talabani, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr
and former premier Iyad Allawi held a meeting in
Arbil, the capital of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, on
April 28, 2012.
Photo: Getty Images. �
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Author
During most of the political crisis Iraqi Presisdent
Jalal Talabani (left) seemed far more open to
working with Premier Maliki (right) than Kurdistan
president Massoud Barzani.
Photo: Getty Images
August 22, 2012
In March 2012, President of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) Massoud Barzani came out against
the continued rule of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
He gave repeated interviews where he called Maliki
an authoritarian who had to agree to real power
sharing or be removed. At one point, he threatened
Kurdish independence if this did not happen. The
President then helped spearhead a no confidence
drive against the premier, which failed. Barzani
always talked as if he was representing all of the
Kurdish parties and the regional government. In
fact, differences between the various Kurdish
factions had been building up beforehand. Barzani�s
actions ended up making this split public, and was
one reason why the no confidence move failed.
In the spring of 2012, President Massoud Barzani
began to publicly express his discontent with Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki. On March 20, Barzani gave
a speech saying that the national unity government
put together after the March 2010 parliamentary
elections was dead. He went on to state that Maliki
was trying to take over the armed forces through his
control of the security ministries, and because of
this, the Kurdish parties would no longer cooperate
with him. Ten days later, on Al Sharqiya TV, the
president claimed Maliki was moving towards
authoritarianism. That led Barzani to call the prime
minister a new dictator the next month. Towards the
end of April, he gave an interview to the Associated
Press where he upped the ante again by threatening
Kurdish independence if a new political deal with
Maliki was not forged. Barzani�s chief of staff
added that the president was tired of the prime
minister failing to fulfill his promises to other
politicians, and wanted him out. Through these
statements President Barzani was staking out his
position as one of the main opponents to the prime
minister. This was two years in the making.
After the 2010 elections, the Kurdish Coalition
solidified Maliki�s second term in office when it
sponsored a meeting in Erbil in October of all of
the winning parties who came to a rough power
sharing agreement. Politicians then scrambled to
divide up the top positions in government to ensure
their own personal influence, and forgot about
placing any checks on the premier, which had been
the main reason why creating a new government had
taken so long. Barzani was caught up in that process
as well, and ended up signing off on the new ruling
coalition in December despite the fact that Maliki
was made acting Defense, Interior, and National
Security Ministers. Unsurprisingly, the prime
minister did not follow through with the Erbil
Agreement as it became to be known, because he was
safely back in office, and would face no penalties
since his rivals had abandoned any restrictions upon
him in their own pursuit of power. As Maliki
continued to solidify his hold, Barzani became
increasingly upset, which led to his verbal attacks
in 2012.
That all culminated in President Barzani leading the
charge for a no confidence vote against Prime
Minister Maliki. On April 28, 2012, Barzani brought
together President of Iraq Jalal Talabani of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Speaker of
Parliament Osama Nujafi from the Iraqi National
Movement (INM), Iyad Allawi the head of the INM, and
Moqtada al-Sadr. Together they warned Maliki about
the need to share power, and issued a 15-day
ultimatum for him to comply with the Erbil
Agreement. Maliki never responded. Barzani and the
INM then tried to put together as many
parliamentarians as possible to sign a letter that
was sent to President Talabani expressing their
desire for a no confidence vote. That was delivered
in June. Talabani ended up rejecting it, because it
did not have the required 163 signatures necessary
for a majority in the legislature to take action
against Maliki.
One major reason why that number was not achieved
was because of Barzani�s actions. All along, Barzani
claimed he was representing the Kurds, and all their
different parties. It was he who escalated the
charges against Maliki, and pushed for the no
confidence vote. That didn�t go over well with
Talabani and his PUK, and the Change List. While
Barzani�s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the
Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic
Group all signed the letter, some of the PUK
parliamentarians, and the entire Change List
delegation did not. A lawmaker from Change said that
the no confidence vote had nothing to do with
furthering the goals of Kurdistan, while another
charged Barzani of acting unilaterally. Before that,
Talabani stated that he was neutral in the no
confidence measure,www.ekurd.net
that he considered the prime minister a partner,
that he didn�t believe Maliki was responsible for
the political crisis, and later told Hurra TV that
he would resign if parties kept on pushing the
matter after he had found the letter lacking the
required number of signatures. The PUK leadership
had also not agreed with Barzani�s attacks on Maliki,
and had been snipping with KDP officials over it.
The PUK and Change List saw Barzani�s insistence on
taking on the prime minister, hosting conferences
with other political leaders, and threatening
Kurdish independence as an assumption of power. More
importantly for Talabani, he did not want to see
Barzani become a kingmaker in national politics if
he was able to remove Maliki. This was a result of
the shift in stature between the two parties. In the
past, the KDP and PUK were roughly equal and had a
power sharing agreement that in part gave Barzani
responsibility for Kurdistan, while Talabani would
handle affairs in Baghdad. Now Barzani was trying to
control both. Not only that, but the balance between
the parties has decidedly shifted in favor of the
KDP, making the PUK feel like it was being left out
in the cold politically. Overall, these splits
showed that the KRG president did not speak for all
the Kurdish parties, and that his aggressive policy
towards the premier caused the Kurdish Coalition to
fracture, and helped sink his proposal for a no
confidence vote.
Beforehand, there were signs of these divisions
between the Kurdish lists. One example was the
handling of fugitive Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi.
In December 2011, Hashemi flew from Baghdad to
Kurdistan to escape an arrest warrant, and ended up
staying there for several months. By March, Talabani
said that Hashemi�s presence was an embarrassment to
the KRG, and that he should leave since he was
wanted on terrorism charges. The next month, a
Change List parliamentarian commented that Hashemi
should not return to Kurdistan after he was done
with a tour of neighboring states. He went on to say
that Hashemi�s stay was only increasing attacks upon
Kurds by other parties, and asked why the KRG should
pay the price for Hashemi�s actions. Similarly, PUK
deputy secretary general Barham Salih stated that
the Kurds should not be involved in Hashemi�s case,
because it could blow back on them. Unsurprisingly,
the PUK and Change List who were critical of Barzani
hosting Hashemi, while he was trying to get out of
his court case, were the same two parties that did
not join Barzani on the no confidence vote. Some of
their complaints about the Hashemi issue were
similar to those over Barzani�s handling of Maliki.
Namely, that Barzani did not consult with the other
Kurdish parties, and acted by himself when he
decided to take Hashemi in.
There was a more recent sign of this Kurdish split
as well when Barham Salih travelled to Baghdad in
August. Salih was supposed to represent a new
Kurdish council meant to repair relations between
the regional and central government after the no
confidence vote. The two leaders of the Kurdish
Coalition in parliament welcomed his arrival, and
Salih went on to meet Maliki and other officials. At
the same time, a source told AK News that Salih did
not represent the Kurdish Coalition. Instead, the
source claimed that Salih was only there for the PUK,
and that he would have no role in mediating between
Maliki and Kurdistan. A telling sign was that
Salih�s delegation was only made up of PUK members,
with no one from Barzani�s KDP. Here, Salih�s group
was supposed to represent the Kurdistan Regional
Government, but he was attacked in the KRG press. It
was also an obvious partisan move, because the
source claimed that any delegation made up only of
the PUK could not represent the region. The fact
that no one from the KDP was present in Salih�s
party might have been payback for the PUK failing to
come through on the no confidence letter.
When Barzani was leading the charge against Prime
Minister Maliki, the president was making his
presence known in Iraqi national politics, while
overlooking those in Kurdistan. Barzani had grown
angry about Maliki�s policies, and decided that the
time was ripe to move against him, and try to remove
him from office. He consulted with likeminded
politicians from around the country, he made a
series of sharp verbal attacks upon the premier, and
then helped organize the no confidence letter. All
of this caused resentment and fears within some
factions of the Kurdish Coalition. The Change List
never seemed to buy into Barzani�s insistence on
confronting Maliki, while the PUK thought that the
president was attempting to usurp too much power.
Both felt left out of any of the decision making as
well. Today these divisions still exist, despite
some public statements that all the Kurdish parties
are working together. The PUK used to have a more
equal footing with the KDP, but has been losing
stature in Kurdistan in the last several years. The
Change List on the other hand, is one of the newest
parties in the region, and has tried to challenge
both Talabani and Barzani. Neither was therefore
happy with the political situation within the
region, and that ultimately was why they dissented
from Barzani over Maliki and the no confidence vote.
These larger issues are as of yet unresolved, so the
next time there is a political crisis in Iraq, they
will come to the fore publicly again.
SOURCES
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, �Iraqi president rebuffs move
to unseat premier,� Associated Press, 5/30/12
Abdulla, Mufid, �Cracks appear in the PUK-KDP
strategic relationship,� Kurdistan Tribune, 4/28/12
Ahmad, Zanko, �Baghdad vs erbil, round two: locals
don�t care, iran and turkey care too much,� Niqash,
4/26/12
Ahmed, Hevidar, �Kurdish Leaders Struggle to Remain
United in Dealing with Baghdad,� Rudaw, 5/18/12
- �Maliki Given Ultimatum at Leaders Meeting in
Erbil,� Rudaw, 4/29/12
- �Talabani Turns Back on Maliki Opponents,� Rudaw,
6/13/12
AIN, �Kurdish MP rules out withdrawing confidence
from Maliki,� 6/7/12
- �Othman confirms disputes between PUK, KDP over
withdrawing confidence from Maliki,� 6/17/12
Ali, Hussam, �Sadr and Barzani will discuss
resolving the political crisis,� AK News, 4/26/12
Associated Press, �AP Interview: Crisis worries
Iraqi Kurdish leader,� 4/25/12
- �Iraq president: PM critics didn�t muster
majority,� 6/10/12
Aswat al-Iraq, �Barzani convinced impossible to deal
with Maliki, Kurdish government official,� 5/16/12
Brusk, Raman, �Islamic Union of Kurdistan announces
for withdrawing confidence from PM Maliki,� AK News,
6/2/12
- �KBC considers Salih�s visit to Baghdad as attempt
to find prospects for future dealing,� AK News,
8/14/12
International Crisis Group, �D�j� vu All Over Again?
Iraq�s Escalating Political Crisis,� 7/30/12
- �Iraq�s Secular Opposition: The Rise And Decline
Of Al-Iraqiya,� 7/31/12
Jakes, Lara, �AP Interview: Iraqi Kurd leader hints
at secession,� Associated Press, 4/25/12
Mahmoud, Nawzad, �Kurdish MPs Want More of a Voice
in Disputes with Baghdad,� Rudaw, 5/3/12
Mohammed, Fryad, �PUK and PDK deny effect of
returning Maliki�s confidence withdrawal on parties�
strategic agreement,� AK News, 6/11/12
- �We didn�t participate in PM withdrawal of
confidence paper, says Gorran,� AK News, 6/2/12
- �Withdrawing confidence from Maliki is Kurdish
coalition�s position, says Kurdish MP,� AK News,
6/16/12
Muhamad, Fryad, �Should we stay or should we go:
Kurds unsure whether to leave Baghdad government,�
AK News, 3/25/12
Najm, Hayder, �tide of opinion turns: desperate
measures for fugitive iraqi VP,� Niqash, 3/15/12
National Iraqi News Agency, �Barazani: We never
accept to live under dictatorship whatever the cost
be,� 5/4/12
- �BREAKING NEWS Talabani receives singed letters
demanding withdrawing confidence from Maliki,
instructs forming committee to check authenticity,�
6/4/12
- �PUK says that number of signatures has not
reached number required to withdraw confidence, when
reaching no need for another message from Talabani,�
6/11/12
- �Talabani: we are embarrassed by Hashemi issue,�
3/7/12
Rao, Prashant, �Iraq PM �monopolising power:�
Kurdish leader,� Agence France Presse, 3/20/12
Rudaw, �President�s Chief of Staff: Kurds Cannot
Decide to Replace Maliki Alone,� 5/15/12
Sabri, Abdullah, �TV: Talabani threatens with
resignation against efforts to change his mind,� AK
News, 6/15/12
Sattar, Omar, �Iraqi-Kurdish Negotiations Getting
Started on a Positive Note,� Al Hayat 8/14/12
Sowell, Kirk, �Inside Iraqi Politics No. 38,�
5/16/12
- �Inside Iraqi Politics No. 40,� 6/20/12
Tiron, Roxana, �Iraq Risks Return to Dictatorship,
Kurdish Leader Says,� Bloomberg, 4/5/12
Zada, Sakar Abdulla, �Kurdish MP Asks VP Hashemi to
Not Return to Kurdistan,� Rudaw, 4/12/12
Zalla, Mihemed Eli, �Kurdish and Sunni Leaders
Accuse Maliki of Authoritarian Rule,� Rudaw, 3/30/12
Al-Zubaidi, Ahmed, �Barham Saleh: My visit to
Baghdad were not commissioned by the provincial
government,� Radio Free Iraq, 8/14/12
Joel Wing, with an MA in International Relations,
Joel Wing has been researching and writing about
Iraq since 2002. His acclaimed blog, Musings on
Iraq, is currently listed by the New York Times and
the World Politics Review. In addition, Mr. Wing�s
work has been cited by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Guardian and the
Washington Independent. You may visit his Blog
Musings On Iraq at musingsoniraq.blogspot.com
Copyright � 2012 Ekurd.net
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