المعهد المصري للدراسات

Operation Sinai 2018: Practices and Implications

“… and use all brute force, all brute force.” – With these words Abdel Fattah al-Sisi concluded his orders to the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army on November 29, 2017 for restoring security in the Sinai. On commemoration of the birth of Prophet Mohamed, gave his security forces a three-month deadline to restore “security and stability” to the country’s northern Sinai governorate after the massacre of the Rawda Mosque which took place during Friday noon prayers on November 24. The massacre was a dangerous turn in the security scene in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula, as it was the first to target this big number of unarmed civilians who have no political orientation, leaving 314 dead, and the first time to attack a mosque at the time of prayers which is revered by all Muslims.

By that time, the comprehensive military operation in Sinai had entered its third and final deadline of the mandate issued on 9 February 2018. The declared objectives were to restore security, protect civilians, and eliminate militant activity in the governorate of North Sinai, which will be reviewed in this paper as well as the implications of the military practices on the ground – one year after the orders given by the head of the regime to launch Operation Sinai 2018 on 29 November 2017.

Not the first operation but the seventh in a row

The military operation announced on 29 November 2017 is not the first operation launched by the Egyptian armed forces since the January 25, 2011 Revolution; in fact, it is the seventh operation in a row. To answer the question: “will this operation succeed?” it is important to review the operations that preceded it, namely:

– Operation Eagle 1 in 2011

– Operation Eagle 2 in 2012

– Operation Martyr’s Right 1, 2, 3, and 4 (2015-2017)

First: Operation Eagle 1

Operation Eagle 1, an Egyptian military campaign in the Sinai Peninsula, was launched on 12 August 2011 to confront the Sinai insurgency, after obtaining approval of Israel to increase the number of army forces and enter areas previously prohibited under the Camp David Agreement. The operation was aimed at securing the gas line between Egypt and Israel against bombings and terminating the activity of perpetrators – the bomber was then referred to as the “masked” man – after several attacks targeted cutting the export of Egyptian gas to Israel, which received widespread popular support at the time.

However, the operation failed to secure the gas line or eliminate the activity of perpetrators, as evidenced by the follow-up news published on the continuation of the bombing operations in November 2011. Youm7, a pro-regime newspaper, published on 8 January 2016 a report entitled “For the 30th. time in a row, the masked man explodes the gas line in El Arish”. However, it is remarkable that on 18 August 2011, six days after the start of Operation Eagle 1, four militants infiltrated from Sinai to the occupied territories targeting the Israeli forces. Then in September 2011, the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis organization officially declared itself for the first time through adopting an attack that took place near Eilat.

Second: Operation Eagle 2 in 2012

Operation Eagle 2 was carried out during the era of President Mohamed Morsi on August 5, 2012, in response to an attack on a military checkpoint near the Kerem Abu Salem crossing in North Sinai, killing 16 soldiers then, and was not adopted by any armed group in Sinai.

Although there were incidents of targeting the army and police forces before this attack (when masked gunmen opened fire on an Egyptian Army checkpoint in the northern Sinai Peninsula on Sunday, killing 15 soldiers), they were very limited and did not receive any media coverage compared to that attack which was carried out in the month of Ramadan at the time when soldiers were preparing for having their iftar – a meal to break their fast after sunset. This led to widespread popular condemnation in general and by the Sinai in particular, as the army forces then enjoyed a privileged position because of non-involvement in any violations against citizens, unlike police forces which were involved in systematic torture and detention against citizens, especially during the last years of Mubarak’s rule. The objective of Operation Eagle 2 was to clear Sinai from the terrorist outposts and to promote military forces operations in areas “B” and “C”, with fortifying the military and security checkpoints and intensifying their security in the areas of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid and Rafah, and control all movement roads.

The operation resulted in achieving calm and preventing the targeting of the military until 2013. However, no results of any investigation were announced about the perpetrators or their objectives. It was also remarkable that the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis organization continued to rise at that time. The bombing of the gas line, coupled with discreet media messages, indicated that the organization was then keen to avoiding any confrontation with the army and security forces. However, despite the announcement of the end of the Operation Eagle 2, the gas line bombings continued. In May 2013, a mysterious incident occurred, where seven soldiers were abducted and then released during the same month without details released about what had happened.

Operation Martyr’s Right 1, 2, 3, and 4 (2015-2017)

The military operations codenamed Operation Martyr’s Right (1, 2,3 , and 4) started on 7 September 2015 only days after the Sinai Province militant group launched on 1 July a series of deadly attacks on a series of checkpoints of the Egyptian military in Sheikh Zwaid, North Sinai. (reportedly leaving 17 soldiers dead, including four officers). Operation Martyr’s Right 1-4 lasted until 2017 ​​. The militant organization managed to impose its control on the operations field in Sheikh Zwaid for several hours before the intervention of warplanes, reportedly Israeli after the Egyptian army sought help from the Israeli side; while other reporters said the warplanes were Egyptian. According to special sources including former military personnel who served at that time in the Second Field Army, orders were given to strike all military checkpoints that were seized by militants as well as clash areas to eliminate everything, including militants and army personnel, to prevent the fall of equipment or prisoners in the hands of militants. The objective of the military operation was to control and clear areas of armed activity in the north and central Sinai.

The results of operations: According to the military spokesman, the terrorist strongholds in the Sinai Peninsula were completely destroyed, Jabal al-Hilal in central Sinai was controlled and cleared completely, the cities of Rafah, Sheikh Zuwaid and Arish have become under full control of the Egyptian army. During his speech at the 24th educational seminar of the armed forces in February 2017, head of military intelligence Mohammad Farag el-Shahat said that 500 militants were eliminated and that the militant Islamic State organization had lost balance because of the military operations.

The maximum estimate of the number of militants that confront the Egyptian army and security forces in Sinai was 1,500. However, based on figures released by the military spokesman from 2014 until now, the number of militants officially killed has exceeded those estimates, which means:

– That the victories declared by the military are false and that they do not follow a successful military strategy, or

– That the number of deaths includes civilians who were extrajudicially killed under the pretext of suspicion or for political revenge, or

– That the policy of the regime pushes more individuals to armed action in defense of themselves, or

– As a result of unprecedented oppression and violations practiced by the army and security forces in Sinai.

We believe that all the above reasons are real and reliable interpretation of what is going on in Sinai.

Operation Sinai 2018: Clearance or eviction and revenge?

The following chart shows a comparison between the military losses of the two conflicting parties during the last nine months, according to sources from both parties as well as the monitoring of the Egyptian Institute of Studies:

On February 9, 2018, the military spokesman of the Egyptian army announced launching a military operation codenamed as “Operation Sinai-2018” aimed at clearing all the hotbeds of armed operations not only at the level of the governorate of North Sinai, but across the whole country, that can be assessed through the following aspects:

However, only a day later, ISIS published an official statement detailing the operation in and revealing that only two combatants had launched the operation and not 14 as the Military Spokesman claimed. ISIS had even published their images carrying their combat names (Abu Hamza and Abu Bakr Al-Muhajir). One of them was Egyptian and the other was from the Gaza Strip. They stormed Al-Qusaymah camp wearing uniforms of the Egyptian army they had seized before. They then got involved into clashes with the forces inside the camp before blowing up themselves up. It later turned out that ISIS’s attack did not fail, as the Military Spokesman described. The attackers had instead managed to infiltrate and storm the camp despite the security procedures.

They then succeeded in getting involved into the clashes and killed many soldiers, including the leader of the camp himself, Major General Ahmad Hamed Zaky Al-Khouli, before blowing up themselves in the center of the military camp, and not in its surroundings as the Military Spokesman claimed. The latter also claimed that the attack was carried out by 14 armed militants, 4 of them were “suicide bombers,” in an attempt to show the magnitude of the attack and to justify the extent of losses in the military forces. In contrast, ISIS’s statement said that only two militants carried out the attack.

Reviewing the pictures of the dead armed group published by the Military Spokesman here, we found that all of them were wearing nothing in their legs but shoes or sandals worn by ISIS members in their attacks like the one that appears in the remains of dead bodies of the two young men who blew up themselves. We have also noticed the repeated appearance of the same submachine gun next to two different bodies, as we will show in the following analysed picture. This is consistent with what we have obtained from exclusive sources that after the attack, a military campaign came to the camp, led by an officer in the Military Intelligence carrying a group of detainees, who were taken down, forced to wear military uniforms, and then shot to show that they had been killed in the attack.

The Military Spokesman had intentionally minimised the losses of the army. He mentioned that only eight soldiers were killed in the attack and 15 others were injured. However, by tracking the Egyptian media we discovered the lie of the Military Spokesman. The numbers we have managed to monitor only through the research exceeded the declared number to more than the double. We monitored the 22 funerals of the dead officers in the operation, namely: Lieutenant Colonel / Ahmad Hamed Zaky Al-Khouli, Captain / Khalid Suleiman, Captain Police / Ashraf Gad, Captain / Ahmad Abdel Rahim Sarsi, First lieutenant / Mahmoud Imad Daghash, Doctor Lieutenant / Mahmoud Kamal Eddine, Sergeant / Abdel Hamid Mahmoud, Sergeant / Mostafa Fotouh Jabr, and recruits (Ahmed Ibrahim Abdel Ghani, Tarek Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Hamid, Samir Ahmed Abdel Latif, Ahmed Emad, Abdel Rahman Hassan Abdel Rahman, Abdel Latif Wahid el Naggar, Adham Salah, Mahmoud Bahgat El-Dababi, Mahmoud Abdel Wahab Ali Hassan Sohag, Rahman Mohammed Ahmed Al-Suwaifi, Mohamed Taha Mahmoud Abdel Bari, Ahmed Mohammed Reda and Mohammed Abul Ala Turki).

In general, the military operations carried out against it, costed ISIS many points of concentration, military and administrative equipment stores as well as the trenches and holes it has been digging. However, ISIS does not believe that the consequences brought by this attack will be reflected on the rate of operations, which is actually low.

Although, communication was subject to the Army’s electronic monitoring, ISIS was still able to establish communication with its information network, internally and externally, as well as with the main organization. For instance, Al-Naba magazine tackled the outcomes of 10 days of the military campaign on ISIS, in its 121st issue published on 1st March. 55 of the army and police forces were killed and 20 vehicles were destroyed, in addition to an attack carried out by suicide attack shock troops (Inghimasi fighters), 3 clashes, 8 sniper attacks and 17 explosive devices.

The Egyptian regime unleashed the National Security apparatus inside the city of Arish which has witnessed high rates of arrest and torture of women. They have been suspected for having relatives, who are wanted or killed during previous demonstrations and armed clashes or suspected of sympathizing with ISIS or the Muslim Brotherhood or appeared in opposition media outlets. The houses of all those who belong to the aforementioned category have been demolished and the people have circulated terrible stories about the torture, which both women and girls were subjected to during detention.

Return of the old guard to the scene: Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, re-appointed Maj. Gen. Mohamed Abdul Fadel Shousha as governor of North Sinai. He previously occupied the same position in 2008 and was governor of South Sinai in 2010 and he is known for having a bad reputation dealing with tribesmen. Maj. Gen. Mohammed Tawfiq appointed Maj.Gen. Mamdouh Abu Zeid as director of the North Sinai Governorate Investigations Department. He described the re-appointment as part of the Ministry of Interior’s strategy to restore the old officers of Sinai who had previous experience with the terrorism file. Mamdouh was one of those who were appointed before the 25 January revolution in several positions, including the position of Criminal Investigation Officer and Inspector General of the Governorate, in order to fight Jama’at Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad). At that time, the regime reported its success in the elimination of this organization. However, the truth was totally the opposite, for the security policy at the time contributed to expanding the range of social grievances and some members of the armed organizations had to disappear and integrate themselves within communities. On the other hand, as a result of the grievances, these members gained tribal and popular sympathy. Many citizens were randomly put in prisons and were consequently introduced to the beliefs of armed organizations, which encouraged these citizens to adopt some of these ideas as a result.

The IS-affiliate Sinai Province’s media mechanisms deliberately revealed that it was not affected by the military operations carried out against it in Sinai, broadcasting a video entitled “The Failed Confrontation” on 25 March 2018. This video deliberately highlighted the extent to which the Egyptian Army forces were coward and incompetent in several scenes, most notably the one depicting an IS member firing one bullet at a soldier, who was standing next to an armored vehicle and who escaped from this bullet using the same vehicle, which body cannot be harmed by a single machine gun shot.

In general, most of the operations mentioned within the broadcasted video were a collection of sporadic operations carried out since 2016 through 2017 and were reduced to a lesser extent by 2018. The most important thing about this issue is the announcement of the next issue, which has occurred at the end and will introduce meetings and messages from some former officials and military officers at the Egyptian security and military institutions. This would constitute an embarrassment to the Egyptian regime, which is trying to highlight that the ones joining armed organizations are only members of opponent Islamic groups.

On the other hand, the fact that ISIS has changed its policies in Sinai, since the death of their former Emir Abu Duaa Al-Ansari, has negatively affected its communities after the organization’s leadership drastically, deliberately, and increasingly got itself involved into side-by-side conflicts. This state has been reinforced after Al-Rawdah Mosque massacre, which ISIS was afraid to adopt after the angry reactions triggered within the circles, which have previously sympathized with it, and even within its members in Sinai. However, the organization’s new leadership did not stop this new trend and published a video that depicted the killing of one of its members, being accused of apostasy for dealing with Al-Qassam Brigades.

This has been accompanied with the frequent emergence of the convulsive rhetoric characterized by poor legitimacy by the media wing of the organization, such as Kadhem Al-Ghazwi speech. In general, some local people attribute these actions to two things: the increasing control of the so-called Hazemites movement over ISIS as well as the security breaches that follow this and work to cause to exhaust itself. This will put an end to ISIS presence in Sinai and dismantle it in favor of other jihadist Salafist organizations, which activities have been interrupted when Ansar Bait al-Maqdis has pledged allegiance to ISIS.

Israeli support and violation of sovereignty

Not surprisingly, the New York Times has mentioned in one of its reports that more than 100 secret air raids have been waged by the Israeli Air Force inside Egypt with the consent of the head of the Egyptian regime, Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi. Jonathan Marcus, a diplomatic correspondent at BBC news website, stated that the Israeli air raids in Sinai indicate to which extent its relationship with the Arab world has developed. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz highlighted this and confirmed the unprecedented level of alliance between Egypt and Israel during the era of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Even, senior Israeli officers call him Sisina (our Sisi).

This unprecedented level of intelligence and military cooperation is one of the reasons behind Israel’s participation in the strikes against ISIS in Sinai, even though the military spokesman Col. Tamer Rifai has denied the validity of these reports or any others. However, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz attributed the reasons behind some of the support that the Israeli Air Force has offered to the Egyptian regime to several factors:

The Israeli F-16 and Apache helicopters are pretty much advanced compared to Egypt’s, in terms of expertise of the crew, technologies, updated jets, the group of guided munitions, the superiority of air and ground control devices, and remote control.

The Israeli website i24 highlighted and re-circulated news published by ISIS news agency Amaq. The Agency published a video and photos showing the effects that the Israeli bombing, had on a house and a car in the Egyptian province of North Sinai. One of the pictures showed the remnants of a part of an “Israeli” missile with Hebrew writings on it.

Here at the Egyptian Institute for Studies, we have documented several attacks by Israeli drones during the months of June, July, and August, which took place at various times in the areas of operations in the northeast of Sinai. These attacks were focused on areas in south of Sheikh Zuwaid and southern Rafah. Aerial penetration operation ranged between monitoring and aerial survey and shelling and quick withdrawal. We have noticed that the air force covered the withdrawal of Israeli aircrafts in some cases and re-bombed the same targets. We have also noticed the following:

Human rights violations during the operation

With the launch of the comprehensive Operation Sinai-2018 With, the year 2018 was the worst in the history of North Sinai governorate for decades due to many practices and violations that took place, including:

Impact of the operation on development and population

The situation in North Sinai witnessed an unprecedented level of deterioration regarding the living conditions and services during 2018. This year witnessed too the eviction of the remaining residents of the city of Rafah, where only part of the southern Rafah area citizens has not yet been included in evictions. The forced eviction has gone beyond the boundaries of the buffer zone. According to various reports, including a report by Human Rights Watch, the army demolished 3,600 buildings from January 15, 2018, to April 14, 2018. Hundreds of hectares of agricultural land were bulldozed over an area of 12 kilometers along the Gaza border, in addition to small pockets of demolition of more than 100 buildings north of Arish airport and the demolition of the homes of dozens of citizens illegally on charges of having relatives wanted by security forces. This comes under a total siege imposed on Sinai, and that had the following effects:

Sinai and popular support for the Egyptian regime policy

The Egyptian regime was keen to highlight the turnout of the people of the province of North Sinai to vote in the presidential elections, and that the voting percentages were not affected by the comprehensive military operation Sinai 2018. In this section, we show the fact that citizens are voting according to the official data announced. In accordance with the population capacity of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, the population of North Sinai on Friday March 30, 2018, is about 458,123 people, and those who are entitled to vote within the province of North Sinai are 250,605 citizens. They vote in 61 subcommittees supervised by 11 public committees and 49 electoral centers, and the votes are divided as follows (111,846 in Arish, 56,844 in Bir Al-Abed, 30,794 in Sheikh Zuwaid, 34,750 in Rafah, 13,004 in Hasna, 3,367 in Nekhel).

On March 25, the army completed its deployment to secure the “electoral” centers and the resting places of the judges inside the province, since the Islamic State had already threatened, in a video version entitled “Protectors of Sharia,” to target the electoral process and its supervisors. It has previously targeted the judges in the 2014 elections, where a number of them were killed. To encourage citizens to participate in the elections, North Sinai Province announced the provision of buses to transport voters from the people of Sheikh Zuwaid and Rafah residents in the city of Arish to transport them throughout the elections days free of charge from Arish to the city of Sheikh Zuwaid, the headquarters of their committees.

Figures:

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